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The (Ir)Relevance of Harmonization and Legal Diversity 
to European Contract Law: A Perspective from Psychology
GARY LOW*
Abstract: Differences between contract laws of Member States are often said to impose 
costs on and deter cross-border trade; and, that in order to increase cross-border trade, 
these contract laws ought to be harmonized. This article considers whether there is a need 
for harmonization; and if so, what form it ought to take. The discipline of psychology is 
relied on to answer two underlying questions: how do actors think about these differences 
when they decide to contract? How does the form of harmonization inﬂ uence such deci-
sions? Insights from cognitive and social psychology are identiﬁ ed and applied to ﬁ nd out 
how actors think and what motivates them to make the decisions they do. These insights 
lead us to question whether actors think about differences between contract laws. This 
is a point which, in turn, questions the need for harmonization. Furthermore, if a great 
many actors prefer the status quo, this strongly suggests that harmonization by way of 
optional rules may not achieve the desired result.
Résumé: Il est souvent dit que les différences entre le droit des contrats des États Membres 
imposent des coûts supplémentaires et découragent le commerce transfrontalier ; que, 
aﬁ n d’augmenter le commerce transfrontalier, ces droits devraient être harmonisés. Cet 
article s’interroge sur le besoin d’harmonisation et, dans l’afﬁ rmative, sur la forme qu’elle 
devrait prendre. Une approche comportementale est adoptée pour répondre à deux ques-
tions fondamentales : comment est-ce que les acteurs envisagent ces différences quand ils 
décident de s’engager par voie de contrat ? Comment le mode d’harmonisation inﬂ ue sur 
de telles décisions ? Les perspectives de disciplines telles que la psychologie cognitive et 
sociale sont identiﬁ ées et appliquées pour découvrir comment les acteurs pensent et ce 
qui motive les décisions qu’ils prennent. Ces perspectives de la psychologie nous mènent 
à douter que les acteurs pensent aux différences entre les droits nationaux des contrats. 
Une telle conclusion remet, à son tour, en cause la nécessité d’une harmonisation. En 
outre, si un grand nombre d’acteurs préfèrent le statu quo, cela suggère fortement que 
l’harmonisation, par le biais de règles facultatives, peut ne pas aboutir au résultat visé.
Zusammenfassung: Die Unterschiede des Vertragsrechts der EU Mitgliedstaaten sollen, 
so sagt man oft, ursächlich für hohe Transaktionskosten und Beeinträchtigungen des gren-
züberschreitenden Handels sein und um dies zu verhindern müsse man das Vertragsrecht 
harmonisieren. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht ob eine solche Harmonisierung not-
wendig ist und in welcher Form diese dann geschehen sollte. Ein psychologischer Ansatz 
soll helfen zwei grundlegende Fragen zu beantworten: Was dachten die Parteien zum 
Zeitpunkt des Vertragsschlusses? Wie kann die Form der Harmonisierung solche Über-
legungen beeinﬂ ussen? Dabei werden Erkenntnisse aus den Disziplinen der  kognitiven 
* LLB (Lond) BCL (Oxon), Tilburg Institute of Comparative and Transnational Law (TICOM) and 
Faculty of Law, Tilburg University. Email <gary.low@uvt.nl>. This publication is part of a project 
entitled ‘National Resistance to the Europeanization of Private Law’ and was made possible through 
funding from The Hague Institute for the Internationalization of Law (HiiL). All opinions and views 
expressed herein are exclusively my own.
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und sozialen Psychologie berücksichtigt, um zu klären, wie die Parteien denken und was 
ihre Überlegungen sind, die zu solchen Vertragsabschlüssen führen. Diese Erkenntnisse 
aus der Psychologie führen zur Frage, ob die Parteien überhaupt über Unterschiede im 
Vertragsrecht nachdenken. Dies leitet zur Frage über, ob eine  Harmonisierung nötig 
ist. Sollte sich herausstellen, dass eine große Anzahl von  Marktteilnehmern für die 
 Beibehaltung des Status Quo ist, so kann vermutet werden, dass eine Harmonisierung 
durch optionale Instrumente nicht das erwünschte Ergebnis liefert.
Keywords: Cross-border trade, European contract law, harmonization, behavioural eco-
nomics, psychology.
1. Introduction
The diversity of contract laws (‘legal diversity’) has frequently been said to burden 
firms and consumers (collectively: ‘actors’) unnecessarily or create barriers to cross-
border trade,1 whether within the international trade community or in Europe.2 
Harmonization of those laws has frequently been proffered as the solution.
Two questions can be posed in considering the extent to which legal diver-
sity burdens actors and whether harmonization is an effective remedy: First, how do 
actors make decisions to enter into contracts and what exactly influences their deci-
sion-making process. The answer to this question enables us to consider the effect 
legal diversity has on our decisions to trade. Second, what is the extent to which 
actors’ choice of governing laws are affected by the form of the rule3 (i.e., whether 
the rule is optional or default). A discussion of this issue enables us to consider the 
effectiveness of different types of harmonizing measures.
These issues have received much attention in the law and economics lit-
erature, but input from psychology is lacking – a discipline of acute significance to 
any discussion on understanding and regulating human behaviour. Insights from 
psychology have mostly been tangentially mentioned in the first issue,4 while they 
appear to be absent with regard to the second.
This article is developed in the following manner. In the first section, I dis-
cuss the problem of legal diversity. Second, a selection of relevant cognitive and 
1 The costs of legal diversity are explored in greater depth in the next section.
2 Commission (EC), ‘European Contract Law’ (Communication), COM (2001) 398 final, 11 Jul. 2001.
3 That is, whether the rule takes the form of a default rule or optional rule.
4 See for instance F. Möslein & K. Risenhuber, ‘Contract Governance – A Research Agenda’, European 
Review of Contract Law 5 (2009): 248, at 273 and 286; G. De Geest & M. Kovac, ‘The Formation of 
Contracts in the Draft Common Frame of Reference’, European Review of Private Law 17 (2009): 
113, at 123, H. Eidenmüller, ‘Party Autonomy, Distributive Justice and the Conclusion of Contracts 
in the DCFR’, European Review of Contract Law 5 (2009): 109, at 124; H. Eidenmüller et al, ‘The 
Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law: Policy Choices and Codification Problems’, 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (2008): 659, at 673 and 695–699; F. Gomez, ‘The Harmonization 
of Contract Law through European Rules: A Law and Economics Perspective’, European Review of 
Contract Law 4 (2008): 89, at 110–115; and G. Smorto, ‘Efficiency and Justice in European Con-
tract Law’, European Review of Private Law 16 (2008): 925, at 946.
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motivational phenomena from various fields within psychology are identified and 
explained. These insights are then applied to the two main issues. I consider whether 
and the extent to which legal diversity is perceived as a burden to cross-border trade 
(section 3). Subsequently, I consider the consequences of choosing different forms 
of harmonization on actors’ conduct (section 4). In section 5, I conclude with a reca-
pitulation of the salient points.
2. The Costs of Legal Diversity
In this section, the differences between the contract laws of the Member States are 
highlighted, and, in economic terms, I explain how they translate into transaction 
costs incurred in cross-border trade. Thereafter, I differentiate legal diversity based 
on the extent to which they affect different types of actors and the different types and 
forms of contract laws. How problems arise as a result of legal diversity and in what 
way and to whom are all important questions to keep in mind when I discuss how 
actors think and behave in the latter half of this article.
As is well known, there remain numerous differences between the contract 
laws of Member States. These range from differences in formation of the contract,5 
revocability of offers,6 good faith and pre-contractual liability,7 contractual interpre-
tation,8 to contractual remedies.9 To this list, we may add important differences at 
5 For example the requirement of consideration in English law (see in general H. Beale, Chitty on 
Contracts, 29th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), Ch. 3). A gratuitous promise is all that is 
required in most civil law systems – for example Dutch law (see A.S. Hartkamp & M.M.M. Tillema, 
Contract Law in the Netherlands (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995), 61).
6 Under English law, an offer can be revoked at will. This is true even if the offeror promises to keep 
the offer open for a period of time or indefinitely – see Routledge v. Grant (1828) 4 Bing. 653. Con-
trast the Dutch position, in which offers are generally revocable unless the offeror states the offer to 
be irrevocable or fixes a time for acceptance – see Art. 6:219-222 BW. Under German law, an offer 
cannot be revoked at will – § 145 BGB, which makes offers binding for a reasonable period of time. 
This is unless the offer is qualified with specific terms like ‘freibleibend’ (subject to changes) or 
‘unverbindlich’ (invitation to treat).
7 Good faith has been used to develop liability during pre-contractual negotiations in several civil law 
systems. For French law, see B. Nicholas, The French Law of Contract, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992), 69–71. For Dutch law, see Art. 6:2 BW and the landmark case of the Hoge Raad in 
Plas/Valburg (HR 18 Jun. 1982, NJ 1983, 723). English law has rejected this approach: see Walford 
v. Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, 138 (per Lord Ackner).
8 For English law, see the illuminating article S.C. Staughton, ‘How Do Courts Interpret Commer-
cial Contracts’, The Cambridge Law Journal 58 (1999): 303. In German law, § 133 BGB specifi-
cally directs the court to ascertain the real intention of the parties, and not to follow what is literally 
expressed in the contract. There are no provisions in the Dutch BW on interpretation, but the Hoge 
Raad case of Ermes/Haviltex (HR 13 Mar. 1981, NJ 1981, 635) states that the literal meaning of 
terms are not conclusive and that, in principle, the reasonable expectations of the parties ought to 
be taken into consideration.
9 As to the divide between the common and civil law on specific performance, see H. Lando & 
C. Rose, ‘The Myth of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries’ (2003), Copenhagen Business 
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the intersection between contract law and property law10 such as the passage of risk, 
and transfer of title11 and retention of title.12 In other words, different legal systems 
disagree on key contractual issues like the formal validity of contracts, the substance 
of contractual obligations, security of interests, and the availability of remedies.
Legal diversity, as seen in the examples outlined above, is said to impose costs 
in two different ways.13 First, actors incur search costs finding out what relevant for-
eign rules may apply to their cross-border contracts as well as the manner in which 
obligations are enforced and remedies granted. Especially in commercial contracts, 
parties then incur negotiation costs in exerting their preferences for which law to 
govern their contract.
The second refers to compliance costs. Those who wish to trade across twenty-
seven different Member States must comply with twenty-seven regimes with differ-
ing levels of consumer protection and different rules on formation and performance 
and enforcement of contracts. Twenty-seven different standard form contracts may 
therefore need to be drafted. To the extent that such costs are disproportionate to 
the perceived benefits, it is often assumed they may function as barriers to trade.
It is generally acknowledged, however, that these differences alone do not 
imply difficulty. The extent to which these are costs which plague cross-border trade 
is dependent, inter alia, on the following.
First, the size of the actor matters. Larger firms are more likely to trade across 
a larger number of domestic markets than as would smaller sized firms – the more mar-
kets they compete in, the greater the costs of legal diversity. Large firms need not be 
deterred by these costs. Economies of scale means they can afford the fees of local law-
yers and managers to navigate through local rules. Such is not the case for smaller firms, 
for whom such forays into foreign markets appear relatively dearer and less lucrative.
On the part of consumers who have very little resource in finding out foreign 
laws, the resulting lack of knowledge of (and thus confidence in) the standard of for-
eign consumer protection laws may even deter them from shopping across borders. 
As with smaller firms, though perhaps worse, consumers are assumed to have a weak 
School Centre for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions – Lefic Working Paper No. 2003-14, 
which strongly suggests that the gulf between the two is closer than once thought. This is so also for 
cases adjudicated under the CISG rules.
10 Having said that, this article only considers rules belonging to contract law. Mandatory rules such as 
those belonging to property law or fiscal regimes are thus beyond the scope of present discussion.
11 See C. Von Bar, U. Drobnig & G. Alpa, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law 
in Europe: A Comparative Study (Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2004), 332–334, for a 
discussion of the ‘unitary’ and ‘split’ approaches to transfers of title in contracts of sale.
12 For an excellent overview of the differences in various jurisdictions, see J.M. Milo, ‘Retention of 
Title in European Business Transactions’, Washburn Law Journal 43 (2008): 121, 131–134.
13 See for instance G. Wagner, ‘The Virtues of Diversity in European Contract Law’, in The Need for 
a European Contract Law: Empirical and Legal Perspectives, ed. J.M. Smits (Groningen: European 
Law Publishing, 2005), 16–18.
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bargaining position and therefore incur no negotiation costs. More often than not, 
they contract on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis.
Second, it matters whether the divergent rule are mandatory or default in nature. 
In many cross-border contracts of sale, the problems of legal diversity are avoided sim-
ply by choice of a governing law. In other words, one ought not to come away with the 
impression that these differences inevitably cause problems for cross-border contract-
ing. Many of the differences referred to function as default rules and may be contracted 
out of, thus avoiding multiple compliance costs. This is especially so with regard to 
business-to-business (b2b) contracts. It has been suggested that search costs are one-off 
costs that, once incurred, no longer function as barriers to trade.14 This is true in the 
static sense, but insofar as laws are dynamic, search costs are likely to be recurrent.
As regards mandatory rules, one is hard put to find divergent ordre public rules. 
In any event, these rules mainly regulate contracts of immorality or illegality, which 
Member States would presumably not want to encourage. Turning to mandatory rules 
regulating business-to-consumer contracts (b2c) like consumer protection, one needs 
to consider the impact of past harmonization at the European level, which implies a 
more limited scope for problems of divergence. Most of the existing consumer protec-
tion rules are based on minimum harmonization. While this means that consumers can 
be assured of a minimum level of protection, firms are forced to adjust their business 
strategy to comply with those legal regimes which depart from the minimum standard.
In summary, the oft-held view is that many of these differences burden or pre-
vent or discourage cross-border contracting. This is because these differences gener-
ate unnecessary and heavy costs on the parties. Such an argument emphasizes the 
costs of diversity. It assumes that, where search and/or compliance costs do exist, 
actors are put off from cross-border contracting because these costs fundamentally 
influence their decisions to contract – as they might well do, if actors behave ratio-
nally. To make such an assumption is, in my view, to conflate how actors ought to 
behave, with how they actually do. Following the behavioural approach, I shall dem-
onstrate in the sections that follow that there is a yawning gap between the two.
3. Exit Homo Economicus, Enter Homo Humanus
Amongst the most influential of models of decision-making processes is the homo 
economicus, which assumes that decision makers are fully rational, fully informed 
and sensitive to subtle distinctions between the available options.15 The idea 
that contracting parties are discouraged from cross-border trade in case of legal 
 diversity is based on this model. Enter what I term the homo humanus. By the 1950s, 
14 See H. Collins, The European Civil Code: The Way Forward (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 66, wherein Collins argues in relation to ‘the need to identify applicable national law. 
As a general rule, parties to a contract are free to select the applicable law. Once they have made a 
selection of a particular national law, there is no longer any barrier to trade’ [emphasis added].
15 W. Edwards, ‘The Theory of Decision Making’, Psychological Bulletin 51 (1954): 380, at 381.
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 psychologists were beginning to challenge the major assumptions in this model16 
and have, for many years since, demonstrated systematic departures from the eco-
nomic norm.17 Called to question their fundamental assumptions, it was only a mat-
ter of time that adherents of the economic analysis of law, the established church 
throughout swathes of law’s empire, clashed with proselytes of this new cult.18 So 
influential is this new movement that one of its high priests dared ‘call for qualifica-
tions of rational choice models’.19
While the veracity of psychology’s contribution to the functional analysis of 
law has not gone unquestioned from academic quarters,20 its impact is such that the 
European Commission has already funded Europe-wide research in the area,21 and as 
recently as 2008 has started to use it to ‘develop a widely-accepted theoretical model 
of consumer economic behaviour’.22 Academics in the area of European contract law 
are also beginning to warm to this movement, though, perhaps, quite gingerly.23
In the next sections, I provide a range of psychological phenomena drawn 
from various fields like cognitive psychology, the psychology of decision-making, 
and social psychology.24 What follows is by no means an exhaustive survey of the 
insights of these fields. The phenomena have been selected on the basis of relevancy 
16 R.J. Sternberg, Cognitive Psychology, 2nd edn (Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers, 1996), 
394, and S. Mullainathan & R.H. Thaler, ‘Behavioral Economics’, NBER Working Paper No. 7948 
(2000).
17 See A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’, Science 185 
(1974): 1124.
18 See the intellectual fléche of behavioural law in C. Jolls, C. Sunstein & R.H. Thaler, ‘A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics’, Stanford Law Review 50 (1998): 1471, with the parry and riposte 
provided by M. Kelman, ‘Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, 
Sunstein, and Thaler’, Stanford Law Review 50 (1998): 1577 and R. Posner, ‘Rational Choice, 
Behavioral Economics, and the Law’, Stanford Law Review 50 (1998): 1551. Finally, the remise by 
Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, 1998, 1593.
19 C. Sunstein, ‘Behavioral Analysis of Law’, University of Chicago Law Review 64 (1997): 1175.
20 For instance A. Stein, ‘A Liberal Challenge to Behavioral Economics: The Case of Probability’, New 
York University Journal of Law & Liberty 2 (2007): 531; G. Mitchell, ‘Why Law and Economics’ 
Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence’, 
Georgetown Law Journal 91 (2002): 67.
21 That is, the European Network for the Advancement of Behavioural Economics, financed under the 
6th Framework Programme. This programme linked several Europe-based research centres as well 
as economists and psychologists together. Teams from the United States also participated. The pro-
gramme was concluded in March 2008.
22 See work area 2 of DG SANCO’s Taskforce on consumer markets 2008, accessed at <http://
ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/ump/dir_b/taskforce.pdf>.
23 See supra n. 4.
24 Cognitive psychology studies basic cognitive processes like memory and perception. Closely related 
is the psychology of decision-making, which studies reasoning, judgment, and the decision-making 
process. Social psychology is the study of how individual decision-making and behaviour is influ-
enced by others. For the purposes of this article, the discipline to which each individual phenom-
enon belongs need not be discussed.
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to this article’s two core questions in that they affect our cognitive processes or have 
motivational influences.25
For ease of application, the cognitive and motivational phenomena are 
grouped in the following way. First, there are the phenomena that affect the way we 
predict future events – this is chiefly relevant for how actors think about and manage 
the risk and costs of legal diversity. Second, tendencies to preserve the status quo are 
discussed. This point has, inter alia, obvious implications for default rules. Third, I 
discuss conduct motivated by notions of fairness and reciprocity, which may encour-
age cooperation to overcome some of the problems of legal diversity. As can be seen, 
some of these insights are relevant to how actors think about legal diversity when 
deciding to contract across borders. Others are relevant to the issue of how forms of 
rules affect choices of governing law. Still others are applicable to both questions. 
The insights are discussed at a level of generality and applied to the specific issues at 
hand in subsequent sections.
3.1 Erroneous Estimations
Everyday, actors have to come to all sorts of simple and complex decisions based on 
a morass of information. Not only would this take too much time, if they deliberately 
processed each piece of information and deliberated on every single choice available 
to them, their limited mental faculties would be overwhelmed.
Instead, they rely on heuristics, which are ‘rules of thumb’ or mental short-
cuts, in order to arrive at the best possible decision using the least amount of mental 
resource. Use of these heuristics saves time and energy, but Kahneman and Tversky 
have demonstrated that overuse of these heuristics can lead to erroneous predic-
tions. According to research in the field, these errors are predictable.26 One such 
heuristic is availability. Another is framing. Other reasons for erroneous estima-
tions may stem from motivational phenomena like overconfidence or the confirma-
tion bias. Another possible factor is the avoidance of cognitive dissonance.
Availability is based on the coincidence of two factors – the ease of recall (i.e., 
salience), and the content of recall (i.e., frequency).27 As the term suggests, ease of 
recall indicates that the level of probability is based on how effortlessly a particular 
25 For reasons of space, not all the relevant phenomena have been surveyed.
26 In general, D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky (eds), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); D. Kahneman & A. Tversky (eds), Choices, 
Values, and Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and T. Gilovich, D.  Griffin & 
D. Kahneman (eds), Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (New York: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2002).
27 See N. Schwarz et al., ‘Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the Availability Heuristic’, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61 (1991): 195 and N. Schwarz & L.A. Vaughn, ‘The 
Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Informa-
tion’, in Heuristics and Biases, eds Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, supra n. 26.
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piece of information can be recalled from memory. 28 Content of recall refers to the 
frequency with which instances of similar events can be recalled from memory. The 
larger the number, the more probable we perceive the event to occur. Other cues may 
affect the availability heuristic and magnify the incidence of erroneous prediction. 
For instance, seeing a house on fire has a greater impact on recall than merely read-
ing about it in the papers.29 Watching the vivid cult classic Jaws may lead people to 
overestimate the probability of shark attacks along the coast.30
Framing is a cognitive schema which people rely upon to interpret and 
respond to events. According to rational choice theories, the manner in which an 
issue is framed ought not to affect the outcome. The classic experiment31 on whether 
framing matters involved describing a hypothetical epidemic to respondents, and 
asking them to choose one of two solutions. Each option involved saving and los-
ing lives. Each of two of the options offered the same number of lives saved or lost, 
though framed in diametrically opposed terms.32 The results showed that the same 
choices, when described in different ways, can radically change the way people make 
their decisions. How one poses a problem and/or its possible solutions is thus cru-
cial to the decision-making process insofar as it triggers in the mind the evaluation 
of future gains and losses.
Next, people tend to be overconfident about themselves and especially com-
pared to others.33 The reverse appears to be true for bad things – they believe bad 
things are more likely to happen to others than to themselves. Studies conducted by 
Weinstein showed that college students in the United States tend to be overoptimis-
tic about their life prospects and pessimistic about the prospects of their peers.34 
Such findings have been replicated in various other studies involving, for instance, 
28 Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, supra n. 17.
29 Ibid., 1127. Although biased newspaper coverage may have similar effect – see P. Slovic, B. Fischoff & 
S. Lichtenstein, ‘Facts vs Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk’, in Judgment under Uncertainty, eds 
Kahnemann, Slovic & Tversky, supra n. 26, 467–468.
30 Ibid., 465.
31 D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, ‘Choices, Values, and Frames’, American Psychologist 39 (1983): 341, 
at 343.
32 Respondents were told that the government was preparing for an outbreak of a disease that was 
expected to take 600 lives. Two choices, A and B, were available. If A is adopted, 200 lives will be 
saved. If B is adopted, there is a one-third probability of saving 600 lives and a two-thirds probability 
that no one will be saved. 72% chose A, while 28% chose. Respondents were then given the choice 
of options C or D. Picking C results in the death of 400 people. If D is chosen, there is a one-third 
chance of no one dying and a two-thirds chance of 600 people dying. The results, when compared, 
were diametrically opposed. 22% chose C, while 78% chose D.
33 P.R. Harris, D.W. Griffith & S. Murray, ‘Testing the Limits of Optimistic Bias: Event and Person 
Moderators in a Multilevel Framework’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95 (2008): 
1225.
34 N.D. Weinstein, ‘Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events’, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 39 (1980): 806.
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smoking-related risks35 and perceived risks of HIV infection amongst sex workers in 
Amsterdam.36
Thirdly, confirmation bias is the ‘unwitting selectivity in the acquisition 
and use of evidence’.37 Where preliminary opinions have formed, evidence is often 
selected from the mass of information to bolster the preconceived opinion to the 
extent that it withstands challenges from contradictory information. Potentially con-
firmatory evidence is taken at face value whereas potentially contradictory evidence 
is treated with scepticism.
Lastly, cognitive dissonance posits that people find discomfort holding simul-
taneously two related conflicting ideas, attitudes or beliefs. To do otherwise is to 
‘pay a heavy psychic price’.38 As a result, people tend towards reducing or eliminat-
ing this conflict by justifying or rationalizing one over the other, or by altering one 
or both ideas, attitudes or beliefs so they are no longer in conflict. This is regardless 
of the truth of the belief.39
3.2 Loss Aversion & Inertia
A second insight is that people’s aversion to losses is disproportionate to their appe-
tite for gains,40 and this motivates people to remain inertial. Therefore, in a phe-
nomenon known as the endowment effect, initial allocations do matter, which is 
contrary to the Coase Theorem.41 Furthermore, people do not discount past expen-
ditures in what is known as the sunk costs effect. Other implications include the sta-
tus quo bias.
The endowment effect is a behavioural pattern where ‘people often demand 
much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it’.42 
35 See W.K. Viscusi, ‘Do Smokers Underestimate Risks?’, The Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): 
1253.
36 F.W. Van Der Velde, J. Van Der Pligt & C. Hooykaas, ‘Perceived AIDS-Related Risk: Accuracy as a 
Function of Differences in Actual Risk’, Health Psychology 13 (1994): 25.
37 For a general overview, see R.S. Nickerson, ‘Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises’, Review of General Psychology 2 (1998): 175.
38 E. Pronin, C. Puccio & L. Ross, ‘Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspec-
tives’, in Heuristics and Biases, eds Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, supra n. 26, 637 (remark made 
in the context of disagreements between draft dodgers and Vietnam war veterans).
39 J.T. Tedeschi, B.R. Schlenker & T.V. Bonoma, ‘Cognitive Dissonance: Private Ratiocination or Pub-
lic Spectacle?’, American Psychologist 26 (1971): 685.
40 For prospect theory, see Kahneman & Tversky, 2000, supra n. 31.
41 R. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960): 1, which states 
inter alia that where there are no transaction costs, parties will bargain towards an efficient out-
come, regardless of their initial allocation of legal rights.
42 D. Kahneman, J. Knetsch & R.H. Thaler, ‘Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and 
Status Quo Bias’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1991): 193, at 194, and also for a review of 
the experiments demonstrating the endowment effect.
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In the oft-quoted Cornell coffee mug experiment,43 students endowed with a coffee 
mug were found to be reluctant to trade the mug for a bar of chocolate. This is in 
stark contrast to those students who were not endowed with either – they did not pre-
fer one over the other in a straightforward choice.44
Sunk costs refer to costs already incurred, which cannot be recovered regard-
less of subsequent events. Such costs, which ought rationally to be ignored, do influ-
ence behaviour in what is known as the sunk costs effect. Thaler explains the sunk 
costs reasoning as a form of mental accounting.45 As he observes, ‘[f]ailing to attend 
an event that has been paid for makes the purchase salient and an evaluation nec-
essary’.46 Notice that failing to attend transforms the price of the event into a loss. 
Since people are averse to losses, they are motivated to attend the event in order to 
avoid the mental accounting.47
The status quo bias, as its name suggests, is a preference for inertia. Such a 
preference is due to the perception that losses from departure from the status quo are 
greater than possible gains.48 In one classic experiment,49 subjects were given a series 
of hypothetical situations and several choices. Results revealed that whenever a particu-
lar choice was designated as the default, it became significantly more popular. Further-
more, ‘the advantage of the status quo increases with the number of alternatives’.50
3.3 Fairness
People are not necessarily self-interested in the narrow sense. Their conduct is 
often influenced by a sense of fairness or, at least, the need to appear to be fair. 
Experiments involving the Ultimatum game51 show that Proposers who do not offer 
43 D. Kahneman, J. Knetsch & R.H. Thaler, ‘Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem’, The Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): 1325.
44 Ibid., at 1342.
45 R.H. Thaler, ‘Mental Accounting Matters’, in Choices, Values, and Frames, eds Kahneman &  Tversky, 
supra 26, 250.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1991, supra 42, 197.
49 W. Samuelson & R. Zeckhauser, ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision Making’, Journal of Risk and Uncer-
tainty 1 (1988): 1.
50 Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1991, supra 42, 198. For empirical evidence in the mutual funds 
industry, see A. Kempf & S. Ruenzi, ‘Status Quo Bias and the Number of Alternatives: An Empirical 
Illustration from the Mutual Fund Industry’, CFR Working Paper No. 05-07 (2005).
51 A simplified version of the Ultimatum game consists of two people who are told to split a sum of, 
say, USD 10 between them. One, the Proposer gets to decide how much he keeps and how much 
to offer the other party. The other, the Responder, is entitled to accept or reject the offer. If the 
offer is accepted, both receive the offered sum. If it is rejected, no one receives any money. Ratio-
nally, the Responder ought to accept since any offer is a net gain. See W. Güth, R. Schmittberger & 
B. Schwarze, ‘An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining’, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 3 (1982): 367.
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 reasonable sums to Responders are liable to be rejected, even though Responders 
ought  rationally to accept every offer made and even though such rejection would 
cost Responders. Camerer and Thaler posit that such motivations manifest in coop-
erative behaviour. Conversely, ‘rude’ conduct is oft construed to be breaches of rough 
standards of fairness, leading to retaliatory conduct. Thus, the price of snow shovels 
ought not to rise after a blizzard unless firms are willing to risk future custom. Like-
wise, under laboratory conditions, ‘firms’ that were willing to pay more were  likewise 
rewarded with ‘employees’ who were willing to voluntarily work harder.52
4. The (Ir)Relevance of Legal Diversity in Decisions to Contract
Building on the insights described above, I turn to consider the two issues outlined 
at the start of this article: first, the costs of legal diversity and decisions to contract 
across borders (section 4.1); and second, how the form of legal rules affect choices 
regarding governing law (section 4.2). As to the first issue, whether, and the extent 
to which the costs of legal diversity affect actors are largely dependent on the manner 
in which heuristics are mis(employed) and where motivational phenomena influence 
them to think or behave in a less than rational manner. Regarding the second issue, 
I rely largely on inertia-related phenomena to assess the effectiveness of optional and 
default rules. A selection of phenomena is discussed within the context of either issue, 
as not all of them are relevant to both. The two issues will be discussed seriatim.
4.1 Decisions to Enter into Contracts
Taking where appropriate, the perspective of the consumer or the firm, I use mainly 
the example of a contract for the sale of goods to illustrate how the relevant phenom-
ena affect how we (do not) think about legal diversity when we decide to transact.53 
After the goods are ordered, they may arrive late or not at all. If they arrive, goods 
may be damaged or defective or of wrong description. The buyer might fail to pay; 
the seller may fail to provide repair. No doubt these are problems which occur during 
or after the life of a contract, but they represent risks the regulation of which may 
influence the prior decision to enter into contracts.
If and when any one of these risks occurs, then the substantive rules and the 
choice of governing law are determining factors in figuring out where the resulting 
losses ought to lie. In cross-border sales, these risks are amplified by the distance 
that separates contracting parties, which means that the goods cannot be inspected 
52 C. Camerer & R.H. Thaler, ‘Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners’, The Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives 9 (1995): 209, at 217.
53 The contract for sale of goods is selected because it allows us to illustrate with sufficient clarity the 
various risks associated with transactions and the manner in which actors deal with them. The results 
may be different for other kinds of contracts like, for instance, financial products. These may involve 
more sophisticated actors, and certain types of risks may be more (or less) prominent or important 
in those contracts.
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at will, and the parties cannot but with some difficulty meet each other to develop 
semblances of trust. Depending on the level of risk, it may be prudent to think about 
the choice and content of laws before actors enter into contracts – but as we shall see, 
these problems and questions related to the choice and content of laws are not always 
given pride of place in decisions to contract.
4.1.1 Over- and underestimating the costs of legal diversity
To recapitulate, availability means that we judge probability based on how easily 
and frequently we can recall similar instances from our memory. Actors tend to be 
overconfident about the likelihood of good things happening to them and avoid-
ing bad things and vice versa in relation to others. The urge to avoid cognitive dis-
sonance affects actors in a similar manner and motivates actors to avoid having to 
deal with conflicting information or choices. Confirmation bias motivates actors to 
filter through information and select only those which confirm their pre-existing 
opinions, and reject those which do not conform. These phenomena lead to over- or 
underestimation by actors of the problems caused by legal diversity.
First, actors are likely to think about problems of legal diversity if they have 
encountered such problems in the past. The perceived likelihood of occurrence and, 
thus, the centrality of such problems in the decision-making process are increased 
if actors can recall these same problems from their past easily and with frequency. If 
these factors are absent, the estimated likelihood may decrease dramatically.
Take for instance a contract governed by German law. An Englishman might 
wrongly assume, as is the case under English law, that he may revoke at will an offer 
he made to his German counterpart. This behaviour may persist until he actually 
does withdraw an offer – at which point ignorance of the foreign rule may cost him 
dearly. On the other hand, this assumption need not amount to anything if he does 
not in fact revoke the offer. More generally, if actors recall experiences litigating 
using certain sets of rules or disputes regarding certain contractual terms, they may 
be more likely to pay attention to choices of law or the use of particular clauses. They 
are thus more likely to ignore these terms if no such memory triggers their atten-
tion, or recall is difficult or infrequent. This may explain why legal professionals 
are more likely to overemphasize the importance of legal rules – they are constantly 
exposed to that fraction of contentious transactions. Not many consumers face these 
problems with such frequency.
Secondly, overconfidence means that actors may underestimate legal risks 
underlying the transaction; or even if they are aware of the risks, downplay their sig-
nificance due to the (falsely) held belief that such mishaps usually happen to others 
and not themselves.54 Such attitudes may explain why actors pay no attention to the 
54 R. Korobkin, ‘Research Paper 04-1: The Problems with Heuristics for Law’, UCLA School of Law – 
Law and Economics Research Paper Series (2004), 5.
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many standard terms and conditions which apportion risks one way or the other. It 
may also explain why actors are not motivated to find out what their legal rights are.55
Third, if an actor has already formed a preliminary view that a particular good 
or service is beneficial, he may look for confirmatory indicators to buttress this view. 
Those who do read the terms of the contract may not do so objectively, reading into 
those terms favourable to themselves, and ignoring or creatively interpreting those 
that appear to conflict with their beliefs.56 More worryingly, confirmation biases may 
severely discourage parties from reading the terms of the contract if they do not expect 
to find confirmatory indicators there.57 These ignored terms come to prominence 
only when there emerges in the future an imperfect performance of the transaction.
This behaviour can also be partly explained with reference to cognitive dis-
sonance, as actors are motivated to avoid terms associated with problems with the 
intended product or service. On a related note, the urge to avoid dissonance moti-
vates actors to avoid informational searches or ignore the need to do so. This is 
because of the fear that searches may yield psychically discomforting information.
4.1.2 Loss aversion de-motivates searching
Particularly with consumers, the sunk costs effect may explain why they do not read 
contracts or assess the risks involved in transactions. Most standard form contracts 
are presented for signing only at the end of the shopping ordeal. By this time, the 
consumer is likely to have invested into the process a good deal of time and energy 
walking up and down the aisles or web pages between different shops or websites, 
comparing and contrasting prices and products (i.e., sunk costs). He is therefore 
committed to the purchase by the time the contract is presented for conclusion of 
the transaction, regardless of whether he knows what his legal rights are.58 If he has 
not already thought about issues like consumer protection or choice of law govern-
ing the contract, the presence of sunk costs effects indicates that he is even less likely 
to think about these issues at the close of the shopping process.59
4.1.3 Cooperation reduces the need to consider legal diversity
Fairness, in the context of contractual relations, means that actors are less moti-
vated to take advantage of the other party’s follies or ignorance and enforce their 
55 That is, actors may reason there is no need to do so since, they reason, there is not going to be prob-
lems with the transaction. See also O. Ben-shahar, ‘The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Con-
tract Law’, John M Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 415 (2008).
56 See S. Becher, ‘Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts’, Louisiana Law Review 
68 (2007): 117, at 132. 
57 Ibid., 132.
58 Ibid., 129.
59 It is of course true that arguments concerning sunk costs do not apply to actors who have yet to com-
mence contracting or those who commence by negotiating respective legal rights and obligations.
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strict legal rights. Reciprocity is expected. This explains, for instance, why the mul-
titude of discrepancies in the presentation of letters of credit is frequently waived by 
the paying party and their banks.60 The prevalence of such behaviour suggests that 
differences in law and difficulties in transactions may not be as overwhelming an 
obstacle as one might otherwise expect, since actors are motivated to cooperate to 
 perform their existing and future obligations.61
4.1.4 Summary: legal diversity is ignored most of the time by most parties?
The effects of cognitive and motivational biases differ across actors and groups of 
actors. As regards consumers, insights from psychology suggest that many in this 
group are unlikely to incur search costs or negotiation costs because they do not per-
ceive legal diversity as a problem for contracting and are motivated to avoid think-
ing of cross-border contracting in those terms. Many of the differences or difficulties 
associated with divergence therefore are likely to be underestimated or ignored. This 
is especially the case if they are unaware of any potential for problems in the first 
place. Furthermore, notions of fairness motivate actors to cooperate to perform con-
tractual obligations, thus ameliorating any need to resort to law (and therefore the 
salience of problems caused by legal diversity). The fact of legal diversity is unlikely 
to be a deterrent to many in this group.
On the other hand, overestimation is likely for those who have encountered 
problems more frequently. Legal counsel, bigger businesses, and some frequent 
cross-border consumers may fall within this category. For those who have experi-
enced scathing problems arising from legal diversity, they may be more motivated 
to find out what their legal rights are – the ease with which they can do so or influ-
ence the choice of laws may determine whether they proceed with contracting across 
borders.
The discussion has thus far revolved around legal diversity in relation to 
search and negotiation costs. As regards compliance costs incurred by firms, many of 
the cognitive or motivational phenomena are irrelevant. There is no over- or under-
estimating the likelihood of relevance or problems with the kinds of rules which 
impose compliance costs – one simply has to comply.
60 R.J. Mann, ‘The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions’, Michigan Law Review 98 
(2000): 2494, and A.W. Katz, ‘Informality as a Bilateral Assurance Mechanism: Comments on 
 Ronald Mann’s the Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions’, Michigan Law Review 98 
(2000): 2554.
61 For a view from empirical legal studies, see for instance: R. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How 
Neighbours Settle Disputes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); S. Macaulay, ‘The 
Real Deal and the Paper Deal’, Modern Law Review 66 (2003): 44; H. Beale & T. Dugdale, ‘Con-
tracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies’, British Journal of Law 
and Society 2 (1975): 45; L.E. Bernstein, ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry’, Journal of Legal Studies 21 (1992): 115.
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4.2 Form and Ef fect
The extent to which harmonization of contract laws may have an effect on contract-
ing behaviour is also dependent, inter alia, on the form it takes. I pause here to note 
that the discussion focuses primarily on firms’ behaviour rather than consumers, 
as the latter have very little bargaining power to influence choice of governing law. 
Even as regards to firms, it would do to bear in mind the unequal bargaining position 
between smaller and larger firms.
In the current debate regarding harmonization of general contract law in 
Europe, there have been arguments in favour of adopting an optional code.62 For two 
reasons, an optional code is said to marry the best of both worlds. First, it provides 
an opportunity to introduce a superior rule that can be adopted across the Inter-
nal Market. Second, it protects parties’ autonomy to choose the rule best suited to 
the transaction. If the optional harmonizing rule is the superior rule,63 then actors 
ought to choose it to govern their contracts.
Using insights from cognitive psychology, I assess the merits of the introduc-
tion of an optional instrument. The findings cast doubt as to whether a carte blanche 
preservation of party autonomy will result in an optimal outcome – that is, that par-
ties choose the best rule for their transactions and that that rule will be adopted 
throughout the EU.
4.2.1 What we use is obviously superior, isn’t it?
Confirmation bias affects decisions regarding the choice of law. Studies have shown 
that people tend to rate familiar things more positively than unfamiliar ones, such 
that ‘familiarity breeds liking’.64 Legal education and culture may also be influen-
tial in developing65 or entrenching66 a particular legal mentalité. ‘Without powerful 
incentives’, observed Collins, ‘the English will not relinquish the common law, nor 
the French the Code Napoléon, nor the Germans the BGB’.67
62 See for instance Commission (EC), ‘European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way 
Forward’, COM (2004) 651 final, 11 Oct. 2004, 5 and 8, and also Commission (EC), ‘First Annual 
Progress Report on European Contract Law and the Acquis Review’, COM (2005) 456 final, 23 Sep. 
2005, para. 4.2 (suggesting the feasibility of a 26th regime for various fields and products).
63 In that the optional rule addresses the problems faced in cross-border contracting.
64 R.B. Zajonc, ‘Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9 
(1968): 1.
65 See J.M. Smits, ‘Convergence of Private Law in Europe: Towards a New Ius Commune?’ in Compara-
tive Law: A Handbook, ed. E. Örücü & D. Nelken (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 229–230 and 
J. Husa, ‘Turning the Curriculum Upside Down: Comparative Law as an Educational Tool for Con-
structing the Pluralistic Legal Mind’, German Law Journal 10 (2009): 913.
66 P. Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 54 (1996): 52.
67 Collins, 2008, supra 14, 25.
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On a related note, the urge to avoid cognitive dissonance may affect the way 
in which we perceive and evaluate arguments related to different contract laws. In 
order to prevent the discomfort associated with dissonance, an English lawyer may 
thus be motivated to avoid an objective assessment and comparison, for example, 
of the merits and demerits of English sales law as against those of a proposed Euro-
pean  harmonizing measure. If forced to make an evaluation, he may alter the value or 
importance of the dissonant elements in what is akin to ex post ‘defensive bolstering’.
4.2.2 Better the devil you know
Importantly, inertia-related biases, as well as statistical evidence regarding the 
(non)-use of transnational optional codes,68 cast severe doubt as to the effectiveness 
of optional rules. The endowment effect is crucial to the bargaining process and has 
clear implications for the importance of the default position. People resist change 
because they prefer the familiarity of the known to the fear of the unknown. Com-
pounded with that, learning enough about one legal regime, much like learning any 
language, requires sinking a great deal of time and energy – ‘once learned is not all 
that easily forgotten or abandoned’.69 One might label this as the sunk costs effect.
The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods 1981 
(CISG) was, for example, introduced as a default rule but it suffered at the outset 
from express contractual exclusions and low usage rates.70 In a survey carried out in 
2008 to determine usage of different regimes of law by firms within Member States, 
almost two-thirds of respondents declared that they usually or occasionally opt-out 
of the CISG.71 It was as if actors preferred and thus reverted to their former default 
rules. The numbers were drastically worse for optional rules like the Principles of 
68 See for instance, P.L. Fitzgerald, ‘The International Contracting Practices Survey Project: An 
Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the United Nation’s Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG) and the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, 
Jurists, and Legal Academics in the United States’, Journal of Law and Commerce 27 (2008): 1; 
K.P. Berger et al, ‘The Central Enquiry on the Use of Transnational Law in International Contract 
Law and Arbitration – Background, Procedure and Selected Results’, in The Practice of Transna-
tional Law, ed. K.P. Berger (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000).
69 See A. de Swaan, Words of the World (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 17, where de 
Swaan talks about ‘linguistic inertia’.
70 For instance, in a 2004–2005 survey conducted by. M. Koehler of US and German legal practitio-
ners and in-house counsel, he found that ‘71.6% excluded the CISG principally or preponderantly’. 
Accessed at <www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/koehler.html>.
  For a contrary opinion, see O. Lando, ‘Have the PECL Been a Success or a Failure?’, Euro-
pean Review of Private Law 17 (2009): 367, at 371, noting the ‘almost global acceptance of the 
CISG’. Statistical evidence supporting that view is absent.
71 Oxford Institute for European and Comparative Law, Civil Justice Systems in Europe: Implications 
for Choice of Forum and Choice of Contract Law (October 2008) at question 27.
  Accessed at <http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/iecl/pdfs/Oxford%20Civil%20Justice%20Survey
%20-%20Summary%20of%20Results,%20Final.pdf>.
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European Contract Law (PECL) and the Unidroit Principles of International Com-
mercial Contracts (Unidroit principles).72
This brings us neatly to the next point. What appears more important than the 
legislative act of labelling a new rule as either ‘default’ or ‘optional’ may be the effect 
that standard form contracts have on the harmonization process.73 The potential prob-
lem is stated easily enough. Legislating a contractual regime as the default position or 
making available optional solutions may not be sufficient if industry-led standard form 
contracts persist in applying their defaults to the exclusion of the new rule. These con-
tracts represent what may be termed the real defaults. Having painstakingly crafted 
these rules, firms and their legal advisors may resist any changes to their position.
Such resistance to legislative defaults and optional choices can be attributed 
to the status quo bias.74 It can also be the result of the endowment effect (e.g., own-
ership of the default term in a standard form contract has increased its value vis-à-vis 
the new default rule) or the sunk cost effect (having invested time and energy and 
money into drafting the standard form), or it may be a matter of avoiding cognitive 
dissonance (and thus a preference for familiarity).75
4.2.3 Summary: form matters
The form of harmonization affects its effectiveness. The question of form is also, in 
part, directly relevant to whether harmonization is necessary in the negative sense – 
that is, the less a measure will be effective, the less reason there is to bring it into 
existence. The above discussion reveals that actors are likely to reason instrumen-
tally to arrive at the answer they want to hear. This is because actors are motivated 
to think that their pre-existing rules are superior and to regard new rules with more 
72 Ibid. See questions 23–26: firms were asked, inter alia, how often they incorporated transnational 
contractual rules in their transactions. The results were troubling. While 70% agreed that cross-
 border transactions would be facilitated by a common European or global contract law, 83% never 
or almost never used the Unidroit principles. In a worse position was PECL, for which the numbers 
jumped to 96%.
73 A case which is taken up in E. McKendrick, The Creation of a European Law of Contracts (Deventer: 
Kluwer, 2004), though not argued from the perspective of psychology.
74 Which in the area of law has been considered largely in Anglo-American literature: see for instance 
C. Gillette, ‘Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks’, Jour-
nal of Legal Studies 19 (1990): 535, R. Korobkin, ‘Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation and 
Contract Law’, in Behavioral Law & Economics, ed. C. Sunstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); C. Sunstein, ‘Switching the Default Rule’, New York University Law Review 77 (2002): 
106. Regarding inertia preferences for default remedies, see for instance R. Sloof, H. Oosterbeek & 
J. Sonnemans, ‘On the Importance of Default Breach Remedies’, Journal of Institutional and Theo-
retical Economics 163 (2007): 5 and A. Tor, ‘On Contractual Defaults and Experimental Law and 
Economics’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 163 (2007): 26.
75 These reasons are not exhaustive. For a Law & Economics perspective of the failure of default rules 
to cater for actors’ preferences, see for instance M. Hviid, ‘Default Rules and Equilibrium Selection 
of Contract Terms’, International Review of Law and Economics 16 (1996): 233.
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than a hint of distrust. Therefore an optional rule, which symbolizes the preserva-
tion of party autonomy, will more often than not be avoided by actors. A default rule 
will have to compete with what I have called real defaults – the real rule which per-
sists in the actors’ minds and cannot be displaced simply through legislation. These 
implications and those relating to how actors think about legal diversity will be dis-
cussed in the following section.
4.3 A Spoonful of Sugar Makes the Medicine Go Down: 
Some Observations and Suggestions
I have selected from psychology what we might learn in relation to whether harmo-
nization is necessary and benefits cross-border trade. These insights were relied on 
to understand how actors think about legal diversity, whether and how it affects deci-
sions to contract, and how the form of harmonization may play a part in influenc-
ing contracting. In the following passages, I make some further observations on the 
need for harmonization based on what we have learnt from the above. Assuming har-
monization is to proceed, I make proposals on how to increase its effectiveness.
Before I commence with the discussion, it is important to recall the distinc-
tion between the types of contract laws to be harmonized,76 as well as the form of 
the intended harmonization. As to the type of contract laws, I refer on the one hand 
to general contract laws, and consumer protection laws on the other, leaving aside 
the property law aspects of contracts as being beyond the ambit of this article. Such 
distinctions are important because, although many of the arguments made in this 
article are of general application, they apply in differing degrees dependent on the 
type of rule and form of harmonization in question.
Furthermore, the distinctions are of practical importance, especially since 
harmonization and consolidation of the consumer acquis, a matter covered by the 
Draft Framework Directive on (Contractual) Consumer Rights (‘Draft Consumer 
Rights Directive’) will no doubt take the form of mandatory rules.77 The Draft Com-
mon Frame of Reference (DCFR),78 on the other hand, seeks to regulate general 
contract law and may possibly be introduced by means of an optional instrument.79
76 One might also suggest a distinction between types of contracts (e.g., a contract for the sale of goods 
as opposed to a credit agreement) since the relevant factors and degrees of relevance might differ 
between these contracts. The above distinctions between types of rules and forms of harmonization 
seek to draw attention to the fact that certain types of rules favour particular forms of harmoniza-
tion. For instance, the majority of consumer protection rules is mandatory in form.
77 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on con-
sumer rights’, COM (2008) 614 final, 8 Oct. 2008.
78 The Draft Common Frame of Reference, as prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code 
and the European Research Group on Existing EC Private Law, outline edition (Munich: Sellier, 
2009).
79 Commission (EC), 2004, supra n. 62. Having said that, drafters of the DCFR have gone beyond con-
tract law to also craft rules on tortious liability and unjust enrichment.
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Bearing the above distinctions in mind, I recapitulate the implications with 
regard to the first issue: that harmonization may not have the intended effect of 
encouraging cross-border trade. For a variety of reasons, laws, whether harmo-
nized or divergent, and whether harmonious or problematic, may not be central 
in the minds of many who conclude or contemplate transactions across borders. 
This is largely because actors tell themselves that they would probably not encoun-
ter problems in their transactions, and therefore thinking about such problems is 
irrelevant and a waste of time. To them, harmonization is a solution to an irrelevant 
or non-existent problem. Further to that, the mere fact of differences in the level 
of consumer protection across Member States is unlikely to be an inhibiting factor 
especially since consumer law as harmonized guarantees a minimum standard of 
protection.80
For those who perceive legal diversity to be a problem, the extent to which 
harmonization is likely to achieve the intended effect remains unclear. While there 
is no doubt that for those who feel inhibited from contracting as a result of perceived 
problems, harmonization may induce contracting. I would caution that the analysis 
does not take into account other factors which inhibit contracting, like natural bar-
riers (e.g., the Alps) or taxation regimes or language – as a matter of fact, harmoni-
zation of contract laws do not solve these other problems. Separately, cooperative 
extralegal behaviour reduces the relevance and need for legal rules and their atten-
dant problems, further ameliorating the need for harmonization. It therefore would 
do to treat with caution arguments that suggest harmonization increases cross-
 border trade.
As to the second issue, which juxtaposed default and optional rules, it was 
noted that the transnational default and optional rules in existence remain statisti-
cally unpopular. According to insights from psychology, this is because actors per-
ceive what they already use as better than the alternative. Their fear of the unknown 
and reluctance to act also motivate them to stick with what they already know. With-
out catering to these predictable biases, it is likely that a default or optional harmo-
nized rule will be as a bride left at the altar, blind to her groom’s past indifference up 
to the day of the wedding.
All is not lost. Several measures can be taken to increase the effectiveness 
of harmonizing measures. First, framing effects have been put to good use by pol-
icy makers in what Korobkin terms ‘heuristic manipulation’.81 Bearing in mind 
actors’ preferences for inertia, harmonizing measures can be framed such that they 
emphasize maintenance of rather than upsetting the status quo. Alternatively (or in 
addition), changes can be framed in a positive and/or negative manner to cater to 
80 For a short discussion, see Wagner, 2005, supra n. 13, 18.
81 Korobkin, 2004, supra n. 54, 15.
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 confirmation biases or trigger availability biases and suggest actors to behave in a 
 particular way.82
Due to cognitive consistency, emphasizing the ‘newness’ of the intended 
measure may not be prudent, insofar as it forces actors to confront the differences 
between the new rule and the psychological default. Assuming they have been using 
a particular rule for a settled period of time and therefore have a favourable view of 
the old rule, dissonance by confrontation will force actors to take steps to reach a 
state of comfort. Most can be counted on to stick to their long-held views and thus 
opt-out of (or choose not to opt-in to) the new rule.
Already within the academic community, there are those who criticize the 
process leading up to the academic DCFR due to its undemocratic credentials, whose 
rules are therefore not truly representative, and therefore is unlikely to be widely 
accepted.83 A related reason why actors may be unwilling to accept a rule such as 
the DCFR lies with notions of ownership and endowment. If this is so, providing for 
participatory democracy (i.e., allowing actors to have a say in the development of the 
envisaged harmonizing rule) may entail actors perceiving some notion of ‘posses-
sion’ over this rule to the extent of their participation. In other words, the European 
legislator can endow actors with ownership of the new rule. Once introduced, it has 
potential to be both a legal as well as a psychological/real default. The greater the 
number of actors who ‘choose’ to adopt this harmonized rule, the closer its effec-
tiveness in reducing differences in laws. Furthermore, if the Europeanized rule to 
be introduced is an optional code, endowing actors with ownership of the rule might 
induce them to swap their current defaults for this psychological default.
Ultimately, regardless of whether the harmonized rule takes the form of 
a default or optional rule, it is inevitably the party who has the stronger bargain-
ing position whose freedom to choose is preserved – and, therefore, it is in most 
instances his contracting conduct which is the relevant one to influence.
82 An example of the latter taken from the Directorate-General Health and Consumers (DG SANCO) 
press release on the Draft Consumer Rights Directive states, amongst other things, that:
  ‘[t]hese new rules are designed to strengthen protection and close the loopholes in key areas 
that are undermining consumer trust’. [emphasis added]
  See the DG SANCO website at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
IP/08/1474&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN>.
83 See for instance, S. Whitaker, The ‘Draft Common Frame of Reference’ – An Assessment, UK Minis-
try of Justice (November 2008), 45, in which it is stated that ‘any position of policy adopted by the 
DCFR is particularly vulnerable to the charge that it lacks democratic legitimacy: the majority vot-
ing within the various groups which is sometimes mentioned here cannot fill any democratic deficit 
for this purpose’. See also M.W. Hesselink, ‘The Common Frame of Reference as a Source of Euro-
pean Private Law’, Tulane Law Review 83 (2008): 919, and J.M. Smits, ‘European Private Law and 
Democracy: A Misunderstood Relationship’, in Essays in the Law and Economics of Regulation in 
Honour of Anthony Ogus, eds M. Faure & F. Stephens (Antwerp & Oxford: Intersentia, 2008).
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As a note of caution, policy makers ought to resist bringing into force Europe-
wide contract law codes, say, for instance, like the DCFR, if their prime motivation 
for doing so is simply because so much time and costs has already been expended. 
Succumbing to that temptation might be a manifestation of the sunk costs effect.
5. Conclusion
Rationality implies that in the context of legal diversity, search costs and negotiation 
costs are incurred. Insights from psychology reveal that many actors do not incur 
these costs because they underestimate problems of legal diversity, or are moti-
vated to downplay their salience, or if conduct influenced by fairness and reciprocity 
reduces the impact of problems caused by legal diversity. Harmonization is therefore 
a solution to a problem that, to their mind, does not exist.
Thus, only those for whom laws are central in decisions to contract and who 
perceive differing laws to be a problem may be encouraged by harmonization to 
conduct more cross-border transactions. For various reasons alluded to above, this 
 number is likely to be smaller than previously implied. I caution to say that more 
empirical research within Europe is needed to determine the extent to which this is 
true. I accept that the fact of harmonization may have some positive effect on trans-
frontier trading, but question whether the margin of increase is worth the cost.
These observations severely undercut reliance on Article 114 TFEU (formerly 
Article 95 EC) as the legal basis for intervention by way of mandatory or default rules 
especially in the area of general contract law.84
As to the compliance costs incurred as a result of legal diversity, these are 
incurred by firms and are unavoidable should they intend to trade across the Mem-
ber States. Given that to be the case, this problem is likely to weigh on their minds 
and function as a brake to the flow of cross-border transactions.
The above arguments ought not to be read as implying harmonization as per 
se unnecessary. There may be other reasons, whether to promote social justice or 
otherwise. I simply caution that should harmonization be introduced and by way of 
an optional code, inertia-related effects may result in poor subscription in this new 
code, undermining its raison d’être. Notwithstanding the limited competence of the 
EC to legislate in this area, default rules are undoubtedly a more effective form of 
harmonization, and by resort a series of heuristic manipulations, may enhance their 
effectiveness and legitimacy.
The above survey of and lessons from psychology are not (and not meant to 
be) exhaustive. It is intended to present an alternative understanding of human 
behaviour and perhaps prompt a rethink of the assumptions underpinning a number 
of the arguments advanced in the harmonization debate.
84 ECJ 5 Oct. 2000, Case C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertis-
ing) [2000] ERC I-8419, and as confirmed in subsequent case law. The issues regarding Art. 95 EC 
are too well known to require introduction.
